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2A~- 1/24/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 10 00, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 815, 
BUFFALO SEWER AUTHORITY UNIT, 
:
 Charging—Party-, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13439 
BUFFALO SEWER AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ Of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
FLORA MILLER SLIWA, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Buffalo 
Sewer Authority (Authority) to a decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Authority violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally altered security checks for those of its employees 
who are represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 815, Buffalo Sewer 
Authority Unit (CSEA). 
The ALJ found that, in May 1992, the Authority had 
unilaterally instituted a trunk check of all cars entering or 
leaving its Bird Island Treatment Plant (Plant). Finding that 
the security check required increased employee participation and 
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was intrusive of employee privacy interests, the AKT ordered the 
Authority's policy rescinded. 
In its exceptions, the Authority argues that the trunk 
inspection is unrelated to the employees' terms and conditions of 
employment and is, therefore, nonmandatory; that the degree of 
change in the new security procedure from the old system is de 
minimis; that the Authority's reasons for instituting the system 
should prevail over the employees' privacy interests; and that 
the scope of the recommended order is too broad because it 
requires rescission of the inspection policy as to everyone and 
not just the employees in the unit represented by CSEA. CSEA 
argues that the ALJ's decision is correct, but concurs in the 
limitation to the remedy sought by the Authority. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision, but clarify the remedy 
ordered by her. 
The Plant is surrounded by a fence, permitting access 
through two gates, which are staffed around the clock by the 
Authority's security guards. The guards are stationed in 
elevated booths, allowing them visual access to the interior of 
all vehicles stopped at the booths. Authority employees carry 
identification cards which must be displayed for the security 
guards' inspection before entering the Plant. All others seeking 
access to the Plant must stop at the guard booth, identify 
themselves, declare the purpose for their visit and identify the 
person they will be meeting. This information is filled out on a 
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form while the guard checks with the Plant to ensure that the 
access is authorized. 
On July 31, 1991, John Trigilio, Treatment Plant Supervisor, 
issued the following memorandum to all employees: 
It has come to my attention that some employees are 
dumpirng^--their—own—garbage-^i-n—the—trash—containers—at 
the treatment plant. We have also found hot water 
tanks, stoves, refrigerators, etc. in the containers. 
We are not in the garbage business and it will not be 
tolerated. Any employee found disposing of their 
refuse in these containers will be subjected to 
disciplinary action. 
All large vehicles (dump trucks, vans, pick-up trucks, 
etc.) will be checked by the guards at the gates. Any 
vehicle found with garbage or any debris will not be 
allowed on the Buffalo Sewer Authority site. 
Effective May 1, 1992, the Authority directed each security 
guard to conduct two random trunk searches of incoming and 
departing vehicles during each shift, without disturbing or 
touching the contents of the trunks. The record does not reveal 
whether the guard takes the keys from the operator of the vehicle 
and opens the trunk himself or whether the operator must open the 
trunk using either the keys or activating a trunk release 
mechanism. It is this directive which is the subject of this 
charge. 
Richard Walczak, Special Assistant to the General Manager, 
testified that the Authority implemented the new trunk search 
policy because, despite the July 31, 1991 memo, there had been an 
increase in the amount of trash which was being brought into the 
Authority for disposal and an increase in the number of thefts of 
Authority and personal property. Walczak testified that the 
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Authority's trash container was being filled to overflowing with 
items which did not come from the Authority, resulting in an 
increase in the cost to the Authority for trash removal. He also 
testified that there had been a few instances of theft of 
Authority property in 1988 and 199 0; but in 1991, there were four 
or five thefts, including expensive tools from the millwright's 
cage, a $600 radio from one of the Authority's vehicles, numerous 
items from employee lockers, which had been broken into, and 
building materials from the construction of a new bathroom 
facility. Since the new security procedure was implemented, 
Walczak testified that the trash problem has been abated and 
thefts have been reduced. 
With respect to the Authority's argument that the trunk 
search is unrelated to the employees' terms and conditions of 
employment, we have long held that work rules generally and 
security procedures which require employee participation 
specifically are mandatory subjects of negotiations.-7 The 
trunk inspection procedure is certainly a work rule, carrying an 
implicit disciplinary component for noncompliance, which affects 
all unit employees. The Authority argues, however, that the 
trunk inspection procedure applies to all who seek entrance to 
the Plant. It argues that, like the imposition of parking 
registration fees in State of New York (SUNY-Binahamton),-' the 
trunk inspection procedure has no relationship to employment 
) ^County of Rensselaer, 13 PERB ^3080 (1980); City of Albany, 
7 PERB ^3078 (1974) . 
2/19 PERB H3029 (1986) . 
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status and is, therefore, nonmandatory. However, the number of 
employees affected by the Authority's work rule far surpasses the 
members of the public affected because only a few vendors, 
contractors or visitors are admitted to the Plant on any day. 
Indeed, the record is devoid of any evidence of visitors or 
vendors utilizing the trash container and the thefts identified 
all appear to have occurred in areas limited solely to employees. 
This reinforces our conclusion that the trunk search affects 
employees primarily. Our previous decisions make clear that when 
public employees are the primary individuals affected by an 
employer policy, the fact that the public-at-large is also 
incidentally affected will not render the employer's action 
nonmandatory -. -f 
The Authority's second exception must also be dismissed. It 
argues that the increase in employee participation in the 
security procedures is de minimus and cannot serve to make the 
procedure negotiable. However, the requirement of employee 
participation in the trunk inspection, whether opening the trunks 
themselves or giving the keys to the security guards, is well 
beyond the degree of participation required under the old system, 
which only required an employee to show an identification 
badge.-1 Not only has the extent of required employee 
participation been increased, but the new policy represents a 
ySee Steuben-Allegany BOCES, 13 PERB ^3096 (1980); County of 
Niagara (Mount View Health Facility) , 21 PERB J[3014 (1980) ; Rush-
Henrietta Cent. Sch. Dist. , 21 PERB J[3023 (1988) , modified on 
other grounds, 151 A.D.2d 1001, 22 PERB ^7016 (4th Dep't 1989). 
^Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist. , 20 PERB [^3053 (1987) . 
I 
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more extensive invasion of the employees' privacy interests than 
the casual, visual inspections of the vehicles' interiors which 
occurred before the car inspection procedure was implemented in 
May 1992. While it appears that, pursuant to the 1991 
memorandum, large vehicles entering the Authority's property were 
"checked", that policy as written did not apply to automobiles. 
Even if it did, the record is devoid of evidence of the method 
used for "checking" vehicles and the degree of employee 
participation, if any, which was required during those "checks". 
The Authority has, accordingly, failed to establish that the 
inclusion of car trunks in its inspection procedures is 
consistent with any pre-existing security policy. It, therefore, 
: ') . . . . . . 
represents a significant change m the Authority's prior 
inspection practice. 
In its third exception, the Authority argues that the ALJ 
did not properly balance its interests against those of the 
affected employees in deciding the negotiability of the trunk 
inspection policy. In this respect, the Authority argues that 
its interests in prohibiting the dumping of garbage on Authority 
property and the prevention of thefts of Authority and employee 
property far outweigh the minimal intrusion on employee privacy 
interests occasioned by its trunk inspection policy. 
J 
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In County of Montgomery.-7 we stated: 
In determining whether a work rule is a mandatory 
subject of negotiation, the Board must strike a balance 
between an employer's freedom to manage its affairs and 
the right of employees to negotiate their terms and 
conditions of employment, (footnote omitted) 
In applying such a balancing test, it is unavoidable 
that—Jthe—nature—of—each—work—ruie—under— consideration 
must be fully examined to determine which interest 
predominates. Implicit in this test is the recognition 
that simply because a work rule relates to the 
employer's mission, it does not follow that the 
employer is necessarily free to act unilaterally in the 
manner in which it chooses to act. If it is faced with 
an objectively demonstrable need to act in furtherance 
of its mission, the employer may unilaterally impose 
work rules which are related to that need, but only to 
the extent that its action does not significantly or 
unnecessarily intrude on the protected interests of its 
employees. Thus, we must weigh the need for the 
particular action taken by the employer against the 
extent to which that action impacts on the employees' 
working conditions. 
Even if the Authority has established a reasonable 
relationship between the trunk inspection policy and the 
accomplishment of its mission-related interests, it has failed to 
show that the policy, which requires employee participation and 
invades their privacy interests, is the least intrusive method of 
eliminating thefts and the unauthorized dumping of personal 
property.-7 As to the bringing of large items of personal 
property, such as refrigerators, washing machines and tires, onto 
Authority property for disposal, it is unlikely that the 
5/18 PERB 53077, at 3167 (1985). 
-
;See County of Niagara (Mount View Health Facility), supra 
note 3, where we noted that the employer must show that 
restrictions which it implements do not exceed what is necessary 
to further its mission. See also State of New York (GOER), 
18 PERB H3064 (1985) . 
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inspection of car trunks, which could not conceal such items, 
will discourage such activity. Likewise, the inspection of the 
trunks of cars leaving Authority property would have no effect on 
employees who were improperly bringing personal property onto 
Authority property for disposal. Nor would the inspection of 
incoming vehicles deter thefts. While the random inspection of 
car trunks leaving Authority property might have the desired 
effect of discouraging thefts, the policy provides only for the 
visual inspection of the trunks by the security guards - they may 
not touch or move any employee possessions in the trunks, so that 
items enclosed in containers or otherwise not in plain view could 
not be inspected. Certainly some of the items which have already 
been stolen - such as a radio, tools, a toilet seat - could just 
as easily be concealed within a car's interior, which is not 
subject to inspection. 
When this balancing test is applied to the Authority's car 
inspection procedure, we find that the Authority's procedure 
"unnecessarily intrudes on the protected interests of its 
employees"-7 because other, less intrusive measures are 
available to address the Authority's identified concerns and that 
the impact on the employees' working conditions outweighs the 
Authority's stated need for the imposition of these security 
measures. 
-'County of Montgomery, supra note 5. 
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Turning to the ALJ's remedial order, the Authority and CSEA 
agree that it is too broad because it requires the rescission of 
the trunk inspection procedure in toto and not just with respect 
to the unit represented by CSEA. We find merit to this 
exception. Although it is implicit in every order issued by PERB 
that the remedial relief set forth therein is limited only to the 
persons or organization covered by the charge, it is here 
appropriate to make the clarification sought by the parties and 
to revise accordingly the notice to be posted by the 
Authority.57 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the decision of the ALJ is 
hereby affirmed and the exceptions filed by the Authority, except 
as to remedy, are dismissed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 
Authority will rescind the May 1, 1992 directive that security 
guards search trunks of vehicles operated by members of the unit 
represented by CSEA and that the Authority will post a notice in 
the form attached at all locations customarily used to post 
written communications to unit employees. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
auline R. KinseLla,CI ^r-Pauline . inse la, Chairperson 
g/Waverlv Cent . Sch. D i s t . , 23 PERB f3029 (1990) 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
We hereby notify all employees of the Buffalo Sewer Authority represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 815, Buffalo Sewer Authority Unit (CSEA) that: 
1. The Authority rescind the May 1, 1992 directive that security guards search trunks of vehicles operated by 
members of the unit represented by CSEA. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Buffalo Sewer Authority 
this Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOYCE A. OWENS, 
Charging Party, 
. -and- CASE-NO.—U^-14 057-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, APSCME, APL-CIO, STATE UNIVERSITY 
COLLEGE AT BUFFALO LOCAL 640, 
Respondent, 
-and-
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE 
AT BUFFALO), 
Employer. 
JOYCE A. OWENS, £TO se 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAUL BAMBERGER of 
counsel), for Respondent 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (JULIE SANTIAGO 
of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Joyce A. Owens 
to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) who dismissed 
her charge against the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, State University College at Buffalo 
Local 640 (CSEA). Owens alleges that the CSEA breached its duty 
of fair representation in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused her request 
to file a contract grievance concerning a change in her work 
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location.-7 The ALJ dismissed the charge after a hearing, 
finding nothing to evidence the arbitrary, discriminatory or bad 
faith conduct necessary to establish a union's violation of its 
statutory duty of fair representation. To the contrary, the ALJ 
held that CSEA had listened to Owens' complaint, investigated the 
circumstances triggering it, informed her promptly that the 
change in work location did not violate the contract and 
explained to her and again to her husband why it had reached that 
opinion. 
In her exceptions, Owens disputes the correctness of CSEA's 
interpretation of the contract, arguing that the change in her 
work location was not "in line with the law." Even were we to 
accept her contention that CSEA was incorrect in its 
interpretation of the contract, however, the charge would still 
have to be dismissed because there are no allegations suggesting 
that any error in judgment was made in bad faith. There being no 
evidence of discrimination or bad faith, and no proof that Owens' 
interpretation of the agreement is "the only possible" one,-7 
there is no basis to conclude that there has been a violation of 
CSEA's duty of fair representation. 
-
7The State of New York, Owens' employer, was made a party to 
this charge pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. That section of the 
Act requires an employer to be joined as a party whenever an 
improper practice charge against a union involves "the processing 
of or failure to process a claim that the public employer has 
breached its agreement . . . " with the union. 
g/See, e.g., Hauppauae Schs. Office Staff Ass'n, 18 PERB 13029 
(1985) . 
i 
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For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and the exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DAT-ED: January—2 4,—19-9 4-
Albany, New York 
. Kinsella, Cnai rperson 
26- 1/24/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BERNARD W. GOONEWARDENA, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14484 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
FEDERATION, 
Respondent. 
BERNARD W. GOONEWARDENA, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Bernard W. 
-^ Goonewardena to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director). Goonewardena alleges 
| generally that the New York State Public Employees Federation 
! (PEF) violated §209-a.2(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by "colluding" in several respects with 
his employer, the State of New York (State), during the 
processing of a grievance regarding his termination in 1991 from 
his position as a Health Program Administrator Trainee. More 
specifically, Goonewardena alleges that PEF denied him his 
request for an African-American or other minority representative 
of his choosing on his grievance and he further alleges that all 
of PEF's decisions which were adverse to his interests, including 
delays in grievance scheduling and its decision not to appeal to 
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the third step of the contractual grievance procedure, were 
racially motivated. 
The Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director) wrote to Goonewardena on 
May 3, 1993, informing him that the charge was deficient because 
certain allegations did not constitute a violation of the Act,-' 
many were time-barred and others were merely conclusions offered 
without any factual support. In a subsequent filing, 
Goonewardena responded to the Assistant Director's deficiency 
notice. The Assistant Director, however, informed him that the 
charge was still deficient for the same reasons and the Director 
then dismissed the charge when Goonewardena declined to withdraw 
it. 
Goonewardena argues in his exceptions that the Director's 
dismissal of the charge denied him his "right" to a hearing at 
which he would submit the facts in support of his allegations. 
He also argues that his charge is timely if measured from 
March 10, 1993, the date PEF's grievance appeals panel decided 
not to proceed with a step 3 grievance. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Director's 
decision. 
-'Goonewardena claims in one of the allegations in his charge 
that PEF's grievance appeals panel did not give him the reasons 
for rejection of his appeal. The Assistant Director determined 
that documents submitted with the charge showed that he had been 
given the reasons for the decision not to appeal. The 
correctness of the Assistant Director's conclusion is not before 
j us because Goonewardena did not make that determination part of 
his exceptions. 
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The charge was filed on April 19, 1993. Therefore, only 
actions on and after December 19, 1992 are within the four-month 
filing period permitted for improper practice charges under 
§204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). Goonewardena's 
allegations concerning PEF's refusal to afford him a 
representative of his choice, the scheduling of an August 1992 
grievance hearing, PEF's acquiescence or agreement permitting the 
State to issue a decision on the grievance after the contractual 
time limits for that decision had been exceeded and a PEF 
representative's refusal on December 8, 1992 to appeal that 
decision, are all untimely on Goonewardena's own allegations. 
These actions are independent of PEF's grievance appeals panel's 
decision not to proceed with the grievance. As each of these are 
separate allegations of impropriety, the timeliness of the 
allegation concerning the grievance appeals panel's composition 
and bias does not render timely any other allegations. 
The allegations which are timely concern PEF's "collusion" 
with the State and the grievance appeals panel's racial bias. As 
the Director correctly concluded, the allegation of collusion is 
entirely conclusory and not supported by any allegation of fact. 
The second allegation is also deficient because it, too, is not 
supported by any facts. The mere fact that PEF's grievance 
appeals panel is composed of three white persons does not 
establish or evidence that the decision not to proceed with 
Goonewardena's grievance was made because he is a "South Asian 
Indian". Indeed, no allegations are set forth which, if proven, 
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would establish that the grievance appeals panel would have 
handled Goonewardena's case differently had he not been a member 
of a minority group. If Goonewardena had any additional facts to 
substantiate his conclusory allegations of collusion and racial 
bias, it was incumbent upon him to set them forth to permit the 
Director to determine whether his charge could be processed. Our 
Rules specifically require a pleading to be factually 
supported-7 and a charging party may not insist that facts 
allegedly in his possession will only be released at a certain 
time or in a certain way.-7 Goonewardena declined to provide 
information in response to the Assistant Director's two requests 
for the articulation of some factual support for his allegations 
of collusion and discrimination and he has now no persuasive 
basis for appeal of the dismissal occasioned by his declination. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed and the exceptions are dismissed.-7 
^Rules, §204.1(b)(3). 
-
7We recently dismissed a charge under similar circumstances in 
which the charging party withheld facts from his pleading. 
County of Suffolk. 26 PERB 53076 (1993). 
-'Goonewardena claims incidentally in his exceptions that the 
deficiency of his charge was not clarified and that he was not 
provided by us with a copy of the Act and our Rules as he had 
requested. The Assistant Director's two letters explained 
sufficiently the perceived deficiency of the charge. The file 
does not disclose a request for a copy of either the Act or 
Rules. However, both are so widely available in print that 
Goonewardena's allegation in this respect does not afford him a 
basis to reverse the Director's decision. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
S)4s\\ -»».T > *^A<^ Iflkr 
Pauline R. Kinsella, ^Chairperson 
Walter!^ Eisenberg, Member X 
Eric J. S, 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROBERT D. WILSON, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14611 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, 
Respondents. 
ROBERT D. WILSON, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) on a charge filed on June 8, 1993 by Robert D. 
Wilson. The Director dismissed Wilson's charge, which alleges 
that his employer, the New York City Transit Authority 
(Authority), and his union representative, the Transport Workers 
Union (TWU), violated, respectively, §209-a.l(a), (d) and (e) 
and §209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act). The charge arises out of arbitration hearings 
scheduled in 1992 and 1993 with regard to disciplinary charges 
brought against Wilson by the Authority concerning an alleged 
road violation committed by Wilson on March 3, 1992. Wilson 
claims that the Authority did not provide him with certain 
allegedly exculpatory audio tapes and documents, and did not 
make available a witness to the incident, and that the Authority 
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and the TWU had, by adjournments and otherwise, not adhered to 
contractual time limitations for the processing and disposition 
of the disciplinary charges. 
To the extent Wilson's allegations were timely filed, the 
Director held that Wilson had no cause of action against the 
Authority under either §209-a.l(d) or (e) because only a union 
may proceed on such allegations.-7 The Director similarly held 
that there was no cognizable cause of action against the 
Authority under §2 09-a.l(a) of the Act because the Authority's 
failure to produce the requested evidence and the witness for 
him and any noncompliance with contractual time limits did not 
violate any of Wilson's statutorily protected rights. 
The duty of fair representation complaint lodged against 
the TWU was dismissed by the Director because it did not contain 
allegations which would evidence arbitrary, discriminatory or 
bad faith conduct. 
Having reviewed the record, we reverse the Director's 
decision dismissing the §209-a.l(a) allegation against the 
Authority and the §2 09-a.2(a) and (c) allegations against the 
TWU with respect to the adjournment of the May 25, 1993 
arbitration hearing. 
Wilson alleges that the contract between the Authority and 
the TWU affords him a grievance procedure under which he has the 
right to the information and witness he requested from the 
) 17See, e.g. , City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 22 PERB 
K3012 (1989). 
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Authority and which further entitles him to have his grievance 
processed within certain time frames, which were exceeded. 
Wilson's charge against the Authority, when read most favorably 
to him, alleges a pattern of repeated adjournments of scheduled 
grievance hearings, obtained by misrepresentation of facts, 
noncompliance with contract requirements, and otherwise in bad 
faith. Similar allegations are made concerning the 
nonproduction of exculpatory evidence and the witness. At this 
point, we do not know whether or to what extent any of these 
allegations can or may be proven. However, what is alleged is a 
systematic, intentional disregard of the contractual grievance 
procedure without a colorable claim of corresponding rights,-1 
which may, if proven, set forth an arguable violation of 
§209-a.l(a). 
We reverse the Director's dismissal of the allegations 
against the TWU in one respect only and otherwise affirm. 
Wilson alleges that the TWU adjourned a May 25, 1993 grievance 
hearing without any apparent or articulated reason, thereby 
permitting the Authority to avoid an automatic dismissal of the 
disciplinary charges against him pursuant to an alleged "one 
adjournment" policy. This allegation, if true, arguably 
evidences arbitrary conduct in violation of the TWU's duty of 
fair representation. 
-'See County of Albany, 25 PERB 53026 (1992) ; New York City 
Transit Auth. , 23 PERB 5[3016 (1990) . 
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For the reasons and to the extent set forth above, the 
Director's decision is reversed and remanded to the Director for 
further processing consistent with this decision. In all other 
respects, the Director's decision is affirmed and the charge in 
those respects is dismissed. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
JUL % fc J). 
Pauline R. Kinsella, thai rperson 
Waltej^L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALBERT EUGENE SEWELL, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14727 
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION 
OF AMERICA, 
Respondent. 
ALBERT EUGENE SEWELL, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Albert Eugene 
Sewell to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing his improper 
practice charge, filed on July 20, 1993, which alleges that 
Local 100, Transport Workers Union of America (TWU) violated 
§209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
failing to present certain evidence at a contractual disciplinary 
hearing held on January 23, 1992. By decision issued 
February 18, 1992, an arbitration panel sustained the 
disciplinary charge against Sewell and imposed a three-day 
suspension. 
Sewell was advised, pursuant to the Director's initial 
investigation,^ that he had no standing to allege a violation 
-'Rules of Procedure (Rules), §204.2. 
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of the duty to bargain provisions of §209-a.2(b) and that he had 
failed to plead sufficient facts to evidence TWU's breach of its 
duty of fair representation. Sewell then filed an additional 
statement of facts, but he did not withdraw the §2 09-a.2(b) 
allegation. He was also advised that the charge, even as 
clarified, was untimely as it had been filed four months after 
the events complained of therein.-' As Sewell declined to 
withdraw the charge, the Director dismissed it.-7 
Sewell excepts to the Director's decision, arguing that "it 
takes more than the four months to channel the papers through the 
system" and that his case represents "an extraordinary 
circumstance" which warrants an extension of the filing period. 
In the months following the decision on his disciplinary charge, 
Sewell alleges that he sought relief through the Congress of 
Racial Equality and also pursued some unspecified forms of 
administrative review to obtain further assistance from TWU in 
attempting to reverse his three-day suspension. We have 
previously held that the exhaustion of other administrative 
remedies, and, certainly, unspecified activities, cannot serve to 
extend the time to file an improper practice charge.-'' 
Therefore, the charge must be dismissed as untimely. 
2/Rules, §204.1(a) (1) . 
-''The Director also noted in his decision that Sewell lacked 
standing to allege a violation of §2 09-a.2(b) of the Act. 
^See, e.g.. New York City Transit Auth.. 10 PERB f3077 (1977). 
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Additionally, Sewell, as an individual, has no standing to 
allege a violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Act.5/ While the 
Director apparently read Sewell's charge and clarification 
liberally to set forth alleged violations of §209-a.2(a) or (c), 
the only allegations he had standing to make, Sewell never 
withdrew the (b) allegation, or sought to amend his charge to 
allege the (a) and (c) violations. 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Director's 
decision and dismiss the exceptions. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
rperson Pauline R. Kmsella', Chai 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member f 
Eric JJ. Schmertz, Member 
-''county of Suffolk and Suffolk County Ass'n of Mun. Employees 
. fGlasheen) , 26 PERB [^3029 (1993) . 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JASPER-TROUPSBURG EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT 
PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13837 
JASPER-TROUPSBURG CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL, for Charging Party 
R. WHITNEY MITCHELL, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Jasper-
Troupsburg Educational Support Personnel Association 
(Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) 
dismissing, as untimely, its charge that the Jasper-Troupsburg 
Central School District (District) violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
increased the workload of a unit employee, Donald Reisman. 
Reisman has been a head bus driver/mechanic for five years. 
His regular duties are to maintain District vehicles and perform 
inspection and preventive maintenance checks on the school buses. 
Until January 1, 1992, Reisman was assisted by Gus Aldrich, a 
cleaner, who was on that date reassigned from the bus garage. 
Aldrich's responsibilities included washing buses and cleaning 
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the interiors, running errands for parts and supplies, changing 
lights, cleaning and maintaining the bathroom, the boiler and the 
bus garage, and helping Reisman grease vehicles and perform bus 
inspections. Reisman testified that, after Aldrich's departure, 
he assumed all of Aldrich's responsibilities and performed them 
every day. As a result, Reisman began working longer hours. In 
April and May, the transportation subcommittee of the District's 
Board of Education began discussions on the possibility of 
alleviating some of Reisman's workload, possibly by combining a 
BOCES bus driver and a cleaner position in the bus garage. At 
the end of June 1992, a custodial helper was reassigned to the 
bus garage for two days a week. That assignment ended in early 
September 1992; this charge was filed on September 15, 1992. 
In its exceptions, the Association argues that it did not 
realize that there had been an increase in Reisman's work until 
June 1992, when he was able to calculate the additional time he 
had spent on more frequent preventive maintenance checks 
occasioned by the increase in miles travelled by the District's 
buses in 1992.-' It also argues that it believed the problem 
had been alleviated by the District's discussions at the 
transportation subcommittee meetings and the assignment of the 
custodial helper to the bus garage in June. As that employee 
^The District's buses travelled 216,000 miles in 1992, as 
compared with 187,000 miles in the previous year. Since bus 
inspections are done every 800 to 900 miles, the Association 
argues that Reisman conducted an additional 34 inspections, at 3 
i hours per inspection, for an increase of 102 hours of work over 
the previous year. 
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assignment in the bus garage ended in September, the Association 
argues that its time to file the charge should run from September 
1992, not when Aldrich left in January 1992. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
A charge is timely if filed within four months-7 of either 
the announcement of a decision to take a unilateral action or the 
first implementation of that action.-7 The increase in 
Reisman's workload resulting in an increase in his work time 
occurred in January 1992 when he first assumed Aldrich7s duties. 
It was not just the increase in preventive maintenance checks 
that increased Reisman's workload. He testified that from the 
first day of Aldrich's reassignment, he began performing 
Aldrich's duties, which took additional time each day. There.is 
no claim that the Association was unaware of Aldrich's 
reassignment and its effect on Reisman or that the District 
attempted to camouflage its actions. Indeed, discussions took 
place in April and May at the Board of Education level to attempt 
to lessen Reisman's workload. The Association did not file the 
charge until September when the temporary summer help was 
^Section §204,1(a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure requires 
that an improper practice charge be filed within four months of 
the time that "a public employer... engaged in an improper 
practice...." 
^Middle Country Teachers Ass'n (Werner), 21 PERB f3012 
(1988) . 
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reassigned from the bus garage,-' apparently assuming the matter 
would resolve itself. That the District and the Association 
informally discussed Reisman's workload or hours does not serve 
to extend the Association's time to file its charge.-7 
Accordingly, the Association's exceptions are dismissed and 
the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
^The charge as filed and litigated is based upon an alleged 
increase in Reisman's workload occasioned by Aldrich's 
reassignment in January 1992. Even if it might be argued that a 
second cause of action arose in September 1992 with the 
reassignment of the custodial helper from the bus garage, that 
allegation has not been placed before us. We will not consider 
improper practices which are not set forth in the charge. East 
Moriches Teachers Ass'n, 14 PERB [^3056 (1981) . 
^New York City Transit Auth., 10 PERB ^3077 (1977). 
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LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, DISTRICT 
COUNCIL 82, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, 
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STATE OF NEW YORK (OFFICE OF PARKS AND 
RECREATION), 
Respondent. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York 
State Inspection, Security and Law Enforcement Employees, 
District Council 82, American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (Council 82) to a decision by the 
Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director). After a three-day hearing, 
the Assistant Director dismissed Council 82's charge, which 
alleges that the State of New York (Office of Parks and 
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Recreation) (State) violated §209-a.l(e) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed to pay certain unit 
employees according to the salary schedule in the parties' 
April 1, 1988 - March 31, 1991 contract. The Assistant Director 
held that under the New York Court of Appeals decision in 
Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters v. State of 
New York (hereafter Surrogates II),-' the parties' contract had 
not "expired" within the meaning of §209-a.l(e) of the Act, which 
makes improper an employer's refusal to continue all of the terms 
of an "expired agreement". Although the State's alleged refusal 
to pay service increments at the required rate occurred after the 
expiration of the stated term of the 1988-91 contract, the 
Assistant Director held that Surrogates II served to continue 
that contract in effect as a matter of law, such that there was 
no "expired agreement" and, therefore, no cognizable §209-a.l(e) 
claim. 
Council 82 argues that the Assistant Director's decision 
misinterprets Surrogates II, misapplies §209-a.l(e) and other 
provisions of the Act, and occasions a result which is 
inconsistent with the legislative history of §209-a.l(e) and the 
purposes and policies of the Act. 
The State argues that the Assistant Director's decision must 
be affirmed because he correctly applied §209-a.l(e) as that 
ly,79 N.Y.2d 39, 25 PERB 1(7502 (1992). 
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subsection of the Act was interpreted by the Court of Appeals in 
Surrogates II. 
The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has filed an amicus curiae brief urging reversal 
of the Assistant Director's decision. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, including those at 
oral argument, we reverse the Assistant Director's decision and 
remand the case to him for decision on the allegations. 
As noted, §209-a.l(e), added to the Act in 1982, makes it an 
improper practice for an employer "to refuse to continue all the 
terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is 
negotiated . . . ." This legislation represented an extension of 
our "Triborough Doctrine," under which mandatory subjects of 
negotiation generally must be continued during any hiatus period 
between collective bargaining agreements.-7 Section 209-a.l(e) 
extended the employer's obligation by requiring the continuation 
of all contract terms, whether or not they are mandatorily 
negotiable, unless the union was responsible for an unlawful 
strike. 
The history of §209-a.l(e) makes it clear that the 
Legislature intended by the enactment of this so-called 
"Triborough legislation" to stabilize the bargaining process by 
diminishing or removing the tensions which are conducive to a 
-'The "Triborough Doctrine" was named for our decision in 
Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth. , 5 PERB [^3037 (1972), the 
first case in which we recognized this status quo principle. 
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disruption of services. It is equally clear from this same 
history that the Legislature also considered §209-a.l(e) to be a 
fair quid pro quo for its prohibition of strikes in the public 
sector. The small number of public employee strikes which have 
occurred following the enactment of §209-a.l(e) suggests that the 
Legislature was correct in its assessment that this legislation 
would promote bargaining, hinder unilateral changes in employment 
conditions and diminish the likelihood of illegal strikes. 
The issue before us has profound implications for the 
administration of the Act and the labor-management relationships 
subject thereto. Put simply, to affirm the Assistant Director's 
decision would effectively repeal §209-a.l(e). If, as he held, 
collective bargaining agreements never expire as a matter of law 
under Surrogates II, no cause of action could ever be stated 
under that subsection of the Act. An affirmance would divest 
PERB of jurisdiction over the investigation and prevention of 
this particular type of employer improper practice despite the 
Legislature's grant to the agency, in §2 05.5(d) of the Act, of a 
general and exclusive power over improper practices, contrary to 
the express public policy of the State as set forth in §200 of 
the Act. Repeal of §209-a.l(e) by interpretation of Surrogates 
II would also contribute to a destabilization of the bargaining 
process and a concomitant increase in destructive self-help 
remedies by employers and unions alike. We consider these 
results to be so completely inconsistent with the expressed 
policies of the Act that we would affirm the Assistant Director's 
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decision only if Surrogates II commands such a result.5/ Our 
task is to harmonize the provisions of the Act as a whole and to 
promote its articulated purposes and policies, while we 
simultaneously adhere to Surrogates II. 
To dismiss Council 82's §209-a.l(e) allegations on a theory 
that Surrogates II holds that collective bargaining agreements 
never "expire" for any purpose would mean that there could not be 
an improper practice under §209-a.l(e) because no union could 
establish the element of an "expired agreement," which is 
necessary to the cause of action as the Legislature has defined 
that particular employer improper practice. We reject, however, 
the proposition that the Court of Appeals in Surrogates II 
intended to effectively repeal the very provision of the Act that 
it used to establish the unconstitutionality of the statute in 
issue in that case, particularly since it had before reviewed, on 
the merits, a PERB determination on §209-a.l(e) allegations.-; 
To the contrary, we believe that the Court's several references 
in Surrogates II to the agreement having "expired" or to its 
stated term having been "completed" show that the Court did not 
-''our approach is fully consistent with those general rules of 
statutory construction which caution against interpretations 
which effect "absurd" results (McKinney's Statutes §145) and 
implied repeals of statutory provisions. (McKinney's Statutes 
§§391-400). 
^County of Nassau v. PERB, 76 N.Y.2d 579, 23 PERB 57019 (1990). 
As with implied repeals of statutory provisions, established 
judicial precedent is not to be considered overruled by 
implication without compelling reason. New Amsterdam Casualty 
Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 266 N.Y. 254 (1935). 
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intend that result. Closer examination of the Court's decision 
confirms our opinion. 
In Surrogates II, the Court of Appeals held that State 
Finance Law §200(2-b), which effected a five-day "lag payroll" 
upon nonjudicial employees of the Unified Court System, was 
unconstitutional because it impaired their collective bargaining 
agreements in violation of the contract clause of the Federal 
Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. 1, §10, CI. 1). 
The Court began its analysis in Surrogates II by stating 
that "the threshold issue is whether a valid and subsisting 
contract existed between parties".-1 In answering that question 
in the affirmative, the Court held that the parties' contract, 
which, like the.contract in this case, had a stated term through 
March 31, 1991, was continued pursuant to §209-a.l(e). The Court 
reasoned that §209-a.l(e), which was extant when the parties to 
that case negotiated their contract, was incorporated as a matter 
of law into their agreements so as to extend the "expired 
agreement".-' 
The Court in Surrogates II was presented only with a 
question concerning the constitutionality of the State's lag 
payroll legislation. Neither PERB's jurisdiction nor the nature 
or elements of a §209-a.l(e) improper practice charge was 
discussed or even mentioned. The Court held only that, in 
2/79 N.Y.2d 39, 44. 
-'19 N.Y.2d 39, 45. 
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enacting §209-a.l(e), the Legislature created private rights of a 
contractual nature enforceable as against the State on a 
constitutional theory. 
There is a very real and perceptible difference between 
parties being in a relationship with concomitant private rights 
for a limited constitutional purpose, as Surrogates II holds, and 
their having an "expired" agreement for the specific purpose of a 
statutorily defined improper practice. Section 209-a.l(e) of the 
Act requires only the latter, irrespective of the former. 
In deciding whether any statutory improper practice cause of 
action is stated, we look to the violation as defined in the Act. 
In relevant context, the "agreement" in §209-a.l(e) is a 
reference back to §201.12 of the Act which .defines an "agreement" 
for all purposes of the Act. In that definition, it is stated 
that an agreement results from an exchange of mutual promises and 
is binding only for the period "set forth therein". It is clear 
to us, therefore, that for purposes of applying §2 09-a.l(e) in 
the improper practice context, the Legislature intended to fix a 
contract's expiration, for purposes of the Act, by reference to 
the term of the contract as defined in the contract itself. That 
interpretation of §209-a.l(e) is consistent with §208 of the Act, 
which fixes expiration of a contract for purposes of defining a 
union's period of unchallenged representation status by reference 
to the term of the contract as set forth in the agreement. 
Our conclusion that Surrogates II does not have the meaning 
ascribed to it by the Assistant Director is buttressed by the 
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Court's own recognition of the purposes sought to be served by 
the enactment of §209-a.l(e). Having recognized that §209-a.l(e) 
is fundamentally important to labor relations harmony and 
stability, we do not believe that the Court could have intended 
by its limited holding in Surrogates II to have rendered that 
statutory provision a nullity. 
The Court in Surrogates II also characterized §209-a.l(e) of 
the Act as a "continuation of benefits" clause. We do not, 
however, consider this characterization to be in any way 
determinative of our analysis. A continuation of contractual 
benefits effected as a matter of law by statute for 
constitutional purposes is not the same as a consensual 
continuation of contract which might affect the expiration date 
of the contract for improper practice purposes by changing the 
period set forth in the contract itself.-7 
The stated term of the agreement in this case is through 
March 31, 1991. Therefore, any actions taken after March 31, 
1991, which allegedly changed any of the terms of the parties' 
-'We have held that contract continuation clauses which have been 
specifically agreed to by the parties preclude a cause of action 
under §2 09-a.l(e) because they continue the contract in effect 
beyond the stated expiration date, thereby changing "the period 
set forth therein" as referenced in §2 01.12 of the Act. City of 
Saratoga Springs
 f 18 PERB [^3009 (1985) ; County of St. Lawrence, 
18 PERB «P052 (1985) . See also City of Utica, 18 PERB [^3013 
(1985) . 
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1988-91 contract before the parties7 negotiation of a successor 
agreement,-f are cognizable under §2 09-a.l(e) of the Act. 
Given the ground for his dismissal of the charge, the 
Assistant Director did not make any findings of fact or 
conclusions of law on the merits of the parties' allegations or 
arguments. A merits disposition will necessitate review and 
evaluation of extensive testimonial and documentary evidence 
raising potential credibility issues. Under the circumstances, a 
remand to the Assistant Director is plainly necessary and 
appropriate. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Assistant Director's 
decision is reversed and such of Council 82's exceptions as are 
directed to the ground for the Assistant Director's dismissal of 
the charge are granted. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the case must be, and hereby 
is, remanded to the Assistant Director for further processing 
consistent with the terms of our decision and order herein. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chairp 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Mejrfber 
^Ericj^rT Schmertz, Member 
-
;The parties did not reach a successor agreement until June 
1992. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Jasper-
Troupsburg Central School District (District) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a motion to reopen an improper 
practice charge filed by the Jasper-Troupsburg Educational 
Support Personnel Association (Association). The ALJ had 
deferred the matter pending the arbitration of a grievance which 
had been filed by the Association with respect to the subject 
matter of the improper practice charge.-1 
The charge alleges that the District violated §209-a.l(a) 
and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it unilaterally reduced the amount of time and pay allotted for a 
particular bus run. The parties agreed that the charge was based 
1;26 PERB [^4552 (1993) . 
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primarily on the unilateral change and that the (a) violation was 
derivative of the (d) violation. The Association had filed a 
grievance alleging that the District's action had also violated 
the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The ALJ, 
therefore, conditionally dismissed the charge. After receipt of 
the arbitrator's award, the Association moved to reopen the 
charge. The ALJ granted the motion because the arbitrator had 
found that the contract was not the source of any right to the 
Association and was silent on any obligation on the part of the 
District to set any minimum times for the bus run in question. 
The District opposed the reopener on the ground that the issue 
had been fully litigated before the arbitrator and that the 
arbitrator's award was not repugnant to the Act. 
The District's exceptions involve only the ALJ's grant of 
the motion to reopen. The ALJ's decision on the Association's 
motion to reopen is not a final decision. The District's 
exceptions are, therefore, properly characterized as an 
interlocutory appeal.-1 
We have previously decided that an "interlocutory appeal 
from rulings by an ALJ is properly entertained only if our 
failure to consider the appeal would result in harm to a party 
which cannot be remedied by our review of the ALJ's final 
-'Pursuant to §2 04.7 of PERB's Rules of Procedure, appeals from 
rulings of an ALJ on motions or objections made as part of the pre-
hearing processing of a charge or at the hearing, may not be made 
directly to the Board unless expressly authorized by the Board. 
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decision and order. "^ The District has offered no evidence of 
any irreparable harm it might suffer if the charge is allowed to 
go forward, such as would warrant our review of the ALJ's interim 
decision at this time. As we recently stated in Mt. Morris 
Central School District:-7 "We are persuaded that the ALJ's 
interim decision to reopen [this case] may properly be reviewed 
should we be asked to consider whatever exceptions may ultimately 
be filed to [the] final decision and order." The District's 
exceptions, which seek our review of the ALJ's decision to reopen 
this case are, therefore, denied at this time. Our denial of 
these exceptions is without prejudice to the District's right to 
file exceptions to the ALJ's final decision pursuant to §2 04.10 
of the Rules. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District's exceptions 
must be, and they are hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York fid.- f k+aL 
iline R. Kinsella, Cha Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
altej>i/ Eisenberg, Member f 
^State of New York (Div. of Parole) and Council 82, AFSCME, 2 5 PERB 
H3007, at 3019-20 (1992). 
y 26 PERB [^3085 (1993) . 
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In the Matter of 
SAANYS/THE MASSENA ASSOCIATION OF 
DIRECTORS AND CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
PERSONNEL, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4052 
MASSENA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
MASSENA CENTRAL SCHOOLS BUILDING 
ADMINISTRATORS' ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board,-7 and it appearing that a 
1/ The Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) found that the unit sought by the 
petitioner was not most appropriate and added certain of the 
positions which were the subject of its petition to existing 
negotiating units of employees of the employer, including 
one represented by the intervenor. [26 PERB 54051(1993)]. 
Because the additions to the intervener's unit were not de 
minimus, the Director ordered that an election be held 
unless the intervenor submitted evidence to satisfy the 
requirements of the Board's Rules of Procedure, 
§201.9(g)(1), for certification without an election. It did 
so, and a decision to that effect was issued by the Director 
[26 PERB f4061 (1993)]. The petitioner did not seek to 
represent that unit. 
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negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
-IT-HIS—HEREBY— CERTIFIED that—the-Massena— Central Schools 
Building Administrators7 Association has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Building principals, assistant to senior high 
school principal, assistant to junior high 
school principal, director of special programs, 
director of buildings and grounds, director of 
transportation, and school lunch director. 
Excluded: All other employees 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Massena Central Schools 
Building Administrators7 Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
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of a c o n c e s s i o n . 
DATED: January 24 , 1994 
Albany, New York 
ikJi^y., U<\<A\c 
Pauline—Rr.-Kinsei-la-,—Chairperson-
JMAA^ / . 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4092 
ROXBURY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
— — Employer^ — — • — — — — • = — — 
-and-
ROXBURY CENTRAL SCHOOL NON-TEACHING 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Cashier, food service helper, cook manager, 
teacher aide, monitor, director of 
transportation, bus driver, head custodian, 
cleaner, deputy treasurer, and typist. 
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Excluded: District secretary (secretary to the 
superintendent), district treasurer, school 
nurse,-7 and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negot4ate^eol-lec1Mjvely--arnGiudes—the—mutual—obligation—to—meet—at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
f 
i 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
J^z^T. Z~-^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eri^J. Schmertz, Member| 
1/ Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the school nurse 
position, previously in a nonteaching unit, has been 
accreted to the unit represented by the Roxbury Teachers 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. 
3C- 1/24/94 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
UNION LOCAL 42 4, A DIVISION OF UNITED 
INDUSTRY WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
— Petitioner-, — — 
-and- CASE NO. C-4153 
WYANDANCH UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424, has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the units agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4153 - 2 
Unit A: Included: All full-time and part-time bus monitors. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Unit B: Included: All full-time and part-time security officers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
—FURTHER,—I-T—IS-ORDERED—feh-at—feh-e—a-bov-e—named—public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memba£ 
3D- 1/24/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF MALONE POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4159 
VILLAGE OF MALONE, 
Employer, 
-and-
THE UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE 
OFFICERS, INC., 
Respondent/Incumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Village of Malone Police 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
Cer t i f i c a t i on - C-CI59 - 2 -
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All police officers up to and including the 
Assistant Chief of Police. 
Excluded: Chief of Police 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Village of Malone Police 
Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Pauline ie R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
X^^c^ Y~^Z. 
Walter L. E i senbe rg , Memb 
3E- 1/24/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 182, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4161 
TOWN OF FRANKFORT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamster Local Union No. 182 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Light Equipment Operators, Heavy Equipment 
Operators and Laborers. 
Excluded: All other. 
Certification - C-4161 - 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local Union No. 
182. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with—respect—to—wages,—^hour-s,—and— other—terms—and—conditions—of— 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
& J.~ t L fr&ttl * 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
C=— C *• 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
3F- 1/24/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4178 
VILLAGE OF COXSACKIE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Security and Law Enforcement 
Employees Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Police Officers. 
Certification - C-4178 - 2 -
Excluded: Police Chief/Officer in Charge. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Security and Law 
Enforcement Employees Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
nego t iat e—co 11eetively—include-s—the—mutua1—ob ligation—to—meet^at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
%Auy k.^jl 
Pauline R. Kinsel la , Chairperson 
fa^uzjz'. 
3G- 1/24/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE-NQT~C-4186— 
SOUTH COLONIE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All non-teaching employees at the District 
office, the secretary to the school lunch 
supervisor and two (2) senior typist positions 
in the pupil services office. 
Certification - C-4186 
- 2 -
Excluded: Custodian, messenger, secretary to the 
superintendent, secretary to the assistant 
superintendent for management services, sr. 
typist in the superintendent's office, 
programmer analyst, programmer, programmer 
trainee and computer operator. 
^FURTHER,—IT—IS-ORDERED—that—the-above—named—pubMe-empl-oyer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
Ud)^ X AVNW4U 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J<' Schmertz, Member ^y 
3H- 1/24/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
AFSCME, LOCAL 1000, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
— — -and-^ CASE-NO. C-4196 
LAURENS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., AFSCME, Local 1000, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Supervisors of Attendance (PT), Cooks, 
Assistant Cooks, Food Service Helpers, Bus 
Drivers/Mechanics (Head Mechanics), Bus 
Drivers, Typists/Confidential Secretaries to 
Cer t i f i ca t ion - C-4196 - 2 -
Excluded: 
Guidance Counselors, Cleaners, Teacher Aides, 
Typists/Central Office Receptionists/ 
Secretaries, Teacher Aides/Treasurer's 
Assistants, Library Clerks, Custodians, Library 
Clerks (Media Center). 
All Registered Professional Nurses, Supervising 
Bus Drivers and all Others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., AFSCME, Local 1000, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
^7 \ 
Pauline R. Kmse l la , Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe^ F 
7
^^^uy^c/l^t' 
Eric J/C Schmertz, Member 
3!" 1/24/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4222 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSIT METRO 
SYSTEM, INC., 
Employer, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 264, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Bus Controllers, Rail Controllers, Rail 
Supervisors, and Bus Supervisors. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-4222 - 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 264, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times__and^coii£er-^Ln—good—faithswith—respect-to—wages-,—hours^—and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
M,u t k**A <L. 
Pauline R. Kinsella,Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe: er 
Eric Jy/Schmertz, Member 
3J - 1/24/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4223 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSIT METRO 
SYSTEM, INC., 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
) above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 264, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Night Garage Supervisors, and Relief Garage 
) Supervisors at the Frontier, Cold Spring and 
Babcock Garages. 
Certification - C-4223 
- 2 -
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 264, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: January 24, 1994 
Albany, New York 
trJ.Lt ^J 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
. / * 
'.^C£ 
Ericyfo.. S c h m e r t z , Member 
